The Flaws of John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism
John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism presents an unyielding and deterministic view of international relations, positing that great powers are inherently aggressive due to the anarchic structure of the international system. While offensive realism has gained traction in academic and policy circles, it suffers from fatal theoretical and empirical flaws. Mearsheimer’s reductionist approach oversimplifies state behavior, ignores historical counterexamples, and fails to account for the increasing role of economic interdependence, technological innovation, and ideological shifts in global politics. His model is not only inadequate for explaining contemporary geopolitics but also risks promoting dangerous policy prescriptions based on flawed assumptions.
A significant flaw in John Mearsheimer’s perspective is his assumption that all nations will act in the same way as the United States. And it is dangerous to view the world or the geopolitics at play from that lens alone. Offensive realism, as outlined by John Mearsheimer, is a theory in international relations that argues great powers are inherently driven to seek dominance in the international system to ensure their survival. According to this view, states act aggressively to maximize their power and security in an anarchic world where no central authority exists to enforce rules. This approach is dangerous because it assumes conflict is inevitable, promoting zero-sum competition and mistrust between nations. In a nuclear-armed world, such behavior increases the risk of catastrophic wars, as states may miscalculate or escalate conflicts in their pursuit of supremacy.
Theoretical Reductionism: Ignoring Agency and Alternative Explanations
One of the most glaring issues with Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is its rigid structural determinism. By claiming that states are perpetually trapped in a cycle of power maximization due to the absence of a global authority, he dismisses the role of diplomacy, cooperation, and domestic political factors. For instance, the European Union directly contradicts his assumption that states will always seek regional hegemony. Rather than engaging in perpetual security competition, European states have chosen deep economic and political integration to prevent conflict. This undermines the idea that anarchy necessitates aggression.
Moreover, states often prioritize stability over unchecked power accumulation. The Nordic countries, Canada, and post-war Japan demonstrate that security can be achieved through alliances, norms, and institutional frameworks rather than relentless power-seeking. The existence of these cooperative models suggests that Mearsheimer’s vision of an inherently aggressive international system is not a universal truth but a selective and biased reading of history.
Empirical Failures: When Great Powers Don’t Behave Aggressively
Mearsheimer’s theory predicts that rising great powers will inevitably seek regional hegemony, yet multiple historical and contemporary cases refute this notion. Take post-Cold War Germany: despite its economic dominance in Europe, Germany has not pursued military expansionism. Instead, it has used its economic power to shape EU policy, contradicting Mearsheimer’s claim that great powers must always seek military primacy.
Similarly, China’s rise, while confrontational in some respects, does not align neatly with offensive realism. Rather than seeking outright regional hegemony through military conquest, China has relied on economic statecraft, trade networks, and diplomatic engagement through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China has engaged in some coercive behaviors in the South China Sea, its actions fall short of the outright military aggression predicted by Mearsheimer’s model. The preference for economic tools over military expansion challenges the offensive realist assumption that military domination is the primary path to power.
Additionally, the U.S.-led liberal order has fostered stability in a way that contradicts offensive realism. While Mearsheimer insists that the U.S. should have prevented China’s rise, historical evidence suggests that economic engagement, alliances, and nuclear deterrence have done more to maintain peace than an outright containment strategy would have.
The Role of Economic Interdependence and Technological Innovation
Another critical flaw in offensive realism is its disregard for economic interdependence and technological change. Mearsheimer downplays how globalization and economic ties reduce incentives for military conflict. According to World Bank data, trade between the U.S. and China reached $691 billion in 2022. Despite geopolitical tensions, neither country has pursued outright military confrontation because the costs of decoupling would be catastrophic. This economic entanglement challenges the offensive realist claim that great powers will always prioritize security over prosperity.
Moreover, nuclear deterrence fundamentally alters the cost-benefit calculus of military aggression. Mearsheimer argues that great powers will seek regional hegemony, yet nuclear weapons make major power wars prohibitively risky. The absence of direct military conflict between nuclear-armed states like the U.S., China, and Russia over the past several decades suggests that deterrence plays a far greater role in state behavior than Mearsheimer acknowledges.
The Policy Dangers of Offensive Realism
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Mearsheimer’s theory is its potential to encourage reckless foreign policy decisions. His belief that states must act aggressively to ensure survival can lead to unnecessary militarization and conflict escalation. For instance, his stance that the U.S. should have actively sought to contain China’s rise ignores the reality that economic engagement has provided stability. His argument that Ukraine should have retained nuclear weapons to deter Russia is similarly dangerous, as it disregards the catastrophic risks of nuclear proliferation.
Additionally, offensive realism fosters a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict. If policymakers embrace Mearsheimer’s worldview, they may prioritize military buildup over diplomacy, increasing the likelihood of confrontation. The Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, justified partly on the assumption that states like Iraq would inevitably seek to challenge U.S. power, is a case study in how aggressive policies driven by flawed realist assumptions can lead to disaster.
Conclusion
John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is an outdated and deterministic framework that fails to capture the complexity of modern international relations. By ignoring diplomacy, economic interdependence, nuclear deterrence, and historical counterexamples, his theory presents an alarmist and misleading view of state behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that great powers do not always pursue regional hegemony through military force, and economic and technological developments have fundamentally reshaped the international system. Rather than embracing offensive realism’s pessimistic determinism, policymakers should adopt a more nuanced approach that recognizes the role of cooperation, economic interdependence, and technological deterrence in shaping global politics.
A Personal Remark: John Mearsheimer is not just a political scientist or an academic — he is far more than that. Mearsheimer is not a neutral scholar — he is a man with an agenda. For years, Mearsheimer has promoted U.S. imperialism and American exceptionalism under the guise of academic exercise and analysis. I know you might be skeptical, and that’s fine. But let me ask you this: Why would an “academic” be so openly committed to containing China’s rise? Why is he unabashedly rooting for the U.S. in this geopolitical struggle? Why did he go so far as to warn his Australian audience against trading with China, absurdly invoking Fidel Castro as a cautionary tale? And why does he downplay Russia as a threat while advocating for better U.S.-Russia relations? Could it be because Russia is predominantly white?
